Racine+c.+Woods

__Racine c. Woods [1983] 2 R.C.S.__

On appeal from Court of Appeal for Manitoba

Appellants: Racine Respondents: Woods

• Racine took Woods’ daughter into their home as a ward for the Children’s Aid Society (birth mother was an alcoholic). After the expiry of the wardship, they kept the child under their care with the consent of Woods (the agreed duration of this custody is contestable). • After several years, Woods showed up at the Racine doorstep demanding for her child. Racine refused to give up the child in “circumstances they believed it irresponsible to do so.” As a result, Woods launched an application for habeas corpus. Racine applied for an order of de facto adoption. • The Racine’s were granted a de facto adoption, based on the fact that the girl had been cared for an maintained by the, for a period of three consecutive years. S. 103(2) of the Adoption Act states that in the case of such an adoption, the consent of the parents or guardian is not required. Furthermore, the judge believed that the Racine’s could well handle any identity crisis the daughter might have in her teenage years. The judge believed that fact that Woods had abandoned her daughter for four years would be enough, in the common law, to consider giving custody to of the child to Woods outside of the child’s best interest. • The adoption order, granted by the court, was overturned at the Court of Appeal. They held that the Racines had deliberately kept Woods away from her daughter during the daughter’s years in the Racine’s care. Therefore, custody could not be grated on the basis of s.103 of the Act. However, the appellants were granted custody of the child, who was made a ward of the court. The respondent could then apply for custody. The appellants appealed this decision.
 * Facts:**

Do the child’s best interests lay with the Metis white “psychological” parents, as opposed to the natural Indian mother?
 * Issue:**

Yes. Appeal dismissed. Adoption order granted.
 * Held:**

Wilson J. (Majority) 1) Even if finding abandonment was a prerequisite for an order under s.103 and abandonment could not be found, the granting of an adoption order based on ‘best interest of the child’ was still valid. Finding abandonment is not necessary for ordering that disposal of natural parental consent for adoption. In the circumstances where the psychological parents have assumed the role of providing a child with a happy and secure home for three consecutive years and the assumed obligations of a parent rest on them, the natural parents’ consent is no longer necessary. 2) The Racine’s refusal of access by the birth mother to her child is not an act which demonstrates that the Racines were trying to determine the fate of the child – it merely demonstrates their concern for her. It is not an illegal assertion of title, as the Court of Appeal held it to be! This act should not be seen as estoppel for arguing abandonment. 3) S. 103 clearly provides for an application for adoption by a person having de facto custody of the child for a prescribed period of time. How the custody was obtained is of no matter (unless, of course, it was done illegally). 4) Leaving the child in the custody of the State, so that she could have contact with a mother of her same cultural background, would merely expose the child to a battleground of media debate. The transracial nature of the custody battle should not be weighted against the best interest of the child. The significance of cultural background and heritage abate over time, where a bond develops between a prospective adoptive parent and a child. “Interracial adoption, like interracial marriage, is now an accepted phenomenon in our pluralist society.” 5) It is more important to protect a child’s secure and loving environment than to nurture blood bonds.
 * Reasoning:**

Children are not property of their parents. Best interest, rather than blood or race or how custody was gained, will determine the future of the child.
 * Ratio:**