R.+c.+Ruzic

=R v Ruzic --- 2001 --- SCC=


 * Facts –** Ruzic was charged for unlawfully importing 2kg of heroin into Canada against s.5(1) of the //Narcotic Control Act//, and of possession and use of a false passport contrary to s.368 of the //Criminal Code//. She admitted committing the offences but claimed she had been acting under duress and thus should be freed from any criminal liability.

According to her testimony, a man threatened to harm her mother with whom she lived in Belgrade unless she took the heroin into Canada. She claimed not to have sought police protection because she thought the Belgrade police were corrupt.

Although the accused acknowledged that her claim of duress did not meet the immediacy and presence requirements under s.17 of the //Code// which provides for this defence, she challenged the constitutionality of this section and raised common law defence of duress.

not apply where the offence that is committed is high treason or treason, murder, piracy, attempted murder, sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm, aggravated sexual assault, forcible abduction, hostage taking, robbery, assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, unlawfully causing bodily harm, arson or an offence under sections 280 to 283 (abduction and detention of young persons).
 * 17. ** A person who commits an offence under compulsion by threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed is excused for committing the offence if the person believes that the threats will be carried out and if the person is not a party to a conspiracy or association whereby the person is subject to compulsion, but this section does


 * Judicial History:** Ruzic was acquitted at trial and the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s appeal.


 * Issue:** Does s.17 of the //Criminal Code// which restricts the defence of duress with immediacy and presence requirements violate an accused person as guaranteed by s.7 of the //Charter//? YES. Acquittal upheld.

-A statutory defence such as found in s.17, like any other legislative provision, is not immune from Charter scrutiny. Parliament has the power to restrict access to a criminal defence but this is subject to constitutional review by the Courts. -The SCC has recognized that moral blameworthiness is an essential component of criminal liability protected under s.7 as a principle of fundamental justice. See previous restrictions of the application of states imposing absolute liability to see the trajectory of this. -The basis for finding it is a principle of fundamental justice that morally involuntary acts should not be punished: -should not be the idea that morally involuntary conduct is synonymous with morally blameless conduct because it is not. -the basis should be that an act must be voluntary to attract criminal liability. -The //actus reus// and //mens rea// of the offence is still present in situations of moral involuntariness such as the instant case. -Moral involuntariness should be protected under s.7 as it is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary behaviour should be criminalized. If a person did not have a real choice in their behaviour, depriving them of their liberty and branding them a criminal would infringe the principle of fundamental justice. -s.17 of the //Code// is in breach of s.7 of the Charter by criminalizing those who have acted involuntarily. It does this by giving a restrictive meaning to duress: only those who are compelled to commit an offence under threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed are eligible to invoke this defence. -In fact, “the section seems tailor-made for the situation in which a person is compelled to commit an offence at gun point” -In terms of whether the words of s.17 include situations where the target of the threatened harm is a third party, it may include these situations. However, in light of the immediacy and presence requirements going along with this restrictive provision, it is unlikely to be applicable to threats to third parties. -The underinclusiveness of s.17 is an infringement of s.7 of the Charter. -In the instant case, the Crown did not try to justify under s.1. Moreover, exceptional circumstances such as war or national emergency are necessary for an infringement under s.7 to be justified by s.1 -The common law defence of duress was never fully replaced by s.17 and remains available. It is unconstrained by these immediacy and presence aspects and is thus more consistent with the Charter. -Like necessity, the common law rule of duress evolved to strike a balance between the conflicting interests of the accused, victims and of society. -**Duress requires a proportionality between the threat and the criminal act to be executed according to the objective-subjective test of the reasonable person in similar situation.** -The threat must be against the personal integrity of the person and **deprive them of any safe escape in the eyes of a reasonable person similarly situated.**
 * Reasoning: Lebel J.**
 * In sum, by the strictness of its conditions, s. 17 breaches s.7of the Charter because it permits individuals who have acted involuntarily to be declared criminally liable.**

Difference between necessity and duress according to Court: they target two different types of situations- Necessity : accused is victim of circumstances Duress: Has its origin in accused’s wrongful acts