R.+c.+Lifchus

Issues: 1. Must trial judge provide jury with explanation of ‘reasonable doubt’? 2. If so, how should this be explained to the jury? 3. Was the charge in this case a misdirection? 4. If the charge in this case was insufficient, ought this Court give effect to the curative proviso set out at s. 686(1)(//b//)(iii) of the //Criminal Code//?
 * //R. v. Lifchus//**: Beyond a Reasonable Doubt (BARD) is not just it’s ordinary meaning, it has special significance in law. It is somewhere between absolute certainty and a balance of probabilities (but closer to absolute certainty).
 * Facts**: Stockbroker convicted of fraud. Trial judge, in defining “beyond a reasonable doubt”, states that ‘doubt’ and ‘reasonable’ are ordinary words. Stockbroker convicted. Alleges that judge’s instruction to jury on ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ was “erroneous”, and appeals.
 * History**: Appeals’ judge stated that jurors needed guidance in understanding reasonable doubt, and that it is an error of law for a trial judge to fail to explain this concept.
 * Holding**: Appeal dismissed. Order directing new trial issued.
 * 1) Yes, because the terms in criminal law import more than what they might in daily language [inextricable link to presumption of innocence].
 * 2) BARD should not be equated with its “ordinary” meaning, nor should it be linked with “moral certainty”. Qualifications of ‘doubt’ should be avoided. Presumption of innocence must be linked to BARD. ‘Reasonable doubt’ should be described as based upon common sense, and as not sympathy/prejudice/frivolities; not proof to an absolute certainty. [See paras. 36 and 37 for summary]
 * 3) Unclear, and insufficient explanation of BARD.
 * 4) Yes.
 * Ratio**: Where BARD is inadequately explained to the jury, there is an error of law and the trial must be re-convened.