Miron+c.+Trudel

- Miron (man) and Valliere (woman) are a common law couple who live together with children in Ontario. - Miron was injured in a car accident. - He claimed damages from his wife's car insurance which extends accident benefits to the "spouse" of the policy holder. - The insurance company (Trudel) denied the benefit, saying Miron wasn't a __married__ "spouse" of Valliere.
 * Facts:**

If not, is it discrimination under s.15 that it does not?
 * Issue:** Does the insurance policy include unmarried spouses within its definition of "spouse"?


 * Held:**
 * Majority -** It violates s.15 and is not saved under s.1. "Read in" to the word "spouse" in the insurance scheme common law spouses.
 * Dissent -**

Miron must prove: (1) Show a denial of "equal protection/benefit" as compared with another person (2) Show that the denial constitutes discrimination - that is, that the denial rests on an __enumerated ground from s.15__. Or that the denial is on an __analogous ground__: treatment is based on stereotypical applicationof presumed group or personal characteristics.
 * Reasoning (Majority - McLachlin +3):**

Then Insurance Company must prove: - Justify the discrimination under s.1 of the Charter

In this case: Marital status is an analogous ground of discrimination under s.15(1).
 * Discrimination on this basis touches dignity and worth of the individual.
 * Unmarried persons were historically disadvantaged group
 * There's a danger of stereotypical group-based decision-marking: distinctions are sometimes granted on personal, immutable characteristics. The individual is not always free to choose whether to marry or not, in practice.

The state failed to show that this violation of s.15 was justified under s.1: - Goal of the legislation: to sustain families when one of their members is injured in an automobile accident. The goal is of pressing and substantial importance. There is no rational connection to the discriminatory distinction and the law impairs the right more than reasonably necessary to achieve that goal. Marital status is not a good marker of who should benefit from a car accident.

Solution: "read in" to the word "spouse" in the automobile insurance scheme any heterosexual couple that has lived for over 3 years together.


 * Reasoning (Concurrence - LHD):**

For a provision to be discriminatory, three factors needed: (1) there must be a legislative distinction (2) the distinction must result in the denial of one of the four equality rights on the basis of mermbership in an identifiable group (3) the distinction must be "discriminatory" The comparator group here is married persons and unmarried persons who are in a relationship analogous to marriage (ie: a relationship of some degree of publicly acknowledged permanence and interdependence).

When "spouse" excludes unmarried couples, it perpetuates the idea that unmarried couples are less worthy of recognition or value as married couples in Canada. Unmarried couples have suffered historical disadvantage, so are sensitive to legislative distinctions having prejudicial effects. Marriage is not always an individual choice - in many couples, one person wants to get married and the other does not. Power imbalances flow from this type of relationship and so the legislature has given increased recognition to these relationships. The insurance scheme tries to protect a family from the devastating consequence of an injury to one of the adults. Protection of the "family" is one of the most important interests in society.

The legislation is not saved by s.1. Goal: protect stable family units by insurance against the economic consequences that follow from injury to a family member. The goal is pressing and substantial. The violation of s.15 is not rationally connected. In Ontario, common law spouses are bound by an obligation of support, but are excluded from automobile insurance schemes. There is not minimal impairment - the group protected (married persons) is underinclusive.

Solution: "read in" to the insurance scheme the definition of common law spouse.

- The //Charter// applies because the policy's terms are prescribed by the //Insurance Act//. - Three steps: (1) has the law drawn a distinction between the claimant and others? (2) does the distinction result in disadvantage? (3) is the distinction based on an irrelevant personal characteristic enumerated in s.15 or analogous to s.15?
 * Reasoning (Dissent - Gonthier + 3):**

An analogous ground is found when distinctions have little rational connection with the subject matter, generally reflecting a stereotype. Some distinctions are not discriminatory, since they reflect a fundamental biological reality or value.

Marriage is a basic social institution and a fundamental right. Married status can only be acquired by free choice. Where individuals choose not to marry, it would undermine the choice they have made if the state were to impose upon them the very same burdens and benefits which it imposes upon married persons. Marriage is distinguished from other relationships by its commitment to permanence. The decision to marry is a joint choice, but it is a choice nonetheless.

The insurance policy does not infringe s.15. It draws a distinction between married and unmarried couples but the distinction is not prejudicial.

Marital status is not an analogous ground. It is distinguished from analogous grounds because:
 * it is consensual, contractual
 * the legislature attaches to marriage a bundle of rights and obligations. This is not true of other enumerated grounds.
 * unmarried couples are no longer the subject of prejudice, although they were in the past. The fostering of marriage as a social institution does not stigmatize unmarried couples nor subject them to stereotypes.
 * the insurance policy is concerned with economic interdependence and unmarried couples do not owe each other mutual support the way married couples do.

There is no obligation on the legislature to extend all the attributes of marriage to unmarried couples.